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type, in which there are agglomeration gains in cities but not in rural areas.  These 
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1 Introduction 
 
In almost all industrialised countries there has, as shown in table 1, been a strong, 
long-term trend towards urbanisation and increased centralisation.   There are no 
indications that the trend is abating.  In Norway, the share of the population living in 
urban areas has increased from 72% to 78% during the period from 1990 to 2008.  
Not only do people move to urban areas – the concentration of people within urban 
areas also increases. In Oslo e.g., the number of people per hectare increased from 
37.9 to 42.3 from 2000 to 2009 (Næss et.al. (2009)). The rest of Europe is 
experiencing a similar development (although there medium-sized cities are growing 
at the expense not only of rural areas, but also of large cities). 
 
 1800 1850 1910 1980 
England 23 45 75 79 
France 12 19 38 69 
Germany 9 15 49 75 
Europe 12 19 41 66 
United States 5 14 42 65 
Australia - 8 42 80 
Latin America 14 18 22 63 
Third World 9 9 10 32 
   
Table 1: Urban share of population 1800-1980 (Crafts and Venables, 2003) 
 
Politically, the trend towards increased centralisation is seen as a problem in many 
countries. Norway is a case in point: 
The overall objective is to ensure equal living conditions throughout the 
country, maintain the settlement patterns and central features of the 
potential in all regions.  People should have a real, independent choice 
regarding their place of residence.  The Government facilitates economic 
development in all parts of the country and encourages people to move to 
rural areas (our italicising). 
(Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development) 
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Therefore, to counter centralisation most governments protect or subsidise agriculture, 
undertake investments in infrastructure in scarcely populated areas, give subsidies or 
establish favourable tax regimes for firms located in rural areas, or relocate 
government agencies from the big cities.  
 
An underlying assumption behind such policies is that there is too much centra-
lisation1. There are, amongst others, two main economic arguments for this view.  
One is that there are diseconomies of scale in big cities due to e.g. pollution and 
congestion (see Kanemoto (1997) for a survey of the urban economics literature based 
on this perspective).  The other, discussed e.g. by Martin (1999 a,b) and Puga (2002) 
within new economic geography models, is that there are negative pecuniary exter-
nalities when people move from rural to urban areas – those who leave do not take 
into account the negative effects on those left behind. 
 
The literature on the new economic geography challenges the presumption that there 
is too much centralisation.  While accepting that there could, at some point, be dis-
economies of scale and negative pecuniary externalities, it argues that, under normal 
circumstances, these are more than offset by the real and pecuniary linkages which 
create positive external scale economies.  The empirical evidence in this regard is 
strong, as centralisation has been a steady and universal trend for more than two 
hundred years.  Had the negative external effects from centralisation been of the same 
order of magnitude as the positive scale economies, or had the pecuniary externalities 
in rural areas been of similar magnitude as the pecuniary externalities in cities, a 
spontaneous reversal of the centralisation trend would have been expected in at least 
some countries or over some extended time periods.  Since neither are seen, there are 
good reasons to believe that the agglomeration gains in urban areas dominate any 
negative externalities in the cities and any positive externalities in rural areas. 
 
If this is the case, the appropriate framework for discussing centralisation is one in 
which the driving force is the set of linkages which produce agglomeration gains of 
                                                          
1 We define centralisation as a “geographic centralisation of the population” in line with the definition 
used in the report “Sentraliseringens pris” (2009) written on request by the Ministry of  Local 
Government and Regional Development.   
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the new economic geography type – see e.g. Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) or 
Ottaviano and Puga (1998) for excellent surveys of the new economic geography 
literature. During the last decade a large number of new economic geography articles 
have looked at problems related to decentralisation and centralisation policies (e.g. 
Matsuyama and Takahashi (1998), Baldwin et.al. (2005), Ulltveit-Moe (2007), Martin 
(1998, 1999a, 1999b), Martin and Rogers (1995), Puga (2001), Andersson and Forslid 
(2003), Forslid (2004)). 
 
With real and pecuniary gains from agglomeration, the general presumption is that a 
market economy will give both too few and too small agglomerations (Norman and 
Venables (2004)) – in other words too few and too small cities.  The purpose of this 
paper is to develop a framework for examining this presumption and to use it to see 
whether the presumption holds (a) when allowing for local city governments who 
actively pursue policies to attract more people in order to make the cities bigger, and 
(b) when allowing for equilibria with cities of unequal size. 
 
The framework is one in which individuals have preferences for living either in the 
city or the countryside.  Even though more and more people choose to move from 
rural to urban areas, many nevertheless express a genuine desire for rural living - their 
reasons being better recreational facilities, neighbourhood qualities, less pollution, 
less crowding etc.  In economic models such non-economic considerations are usually 
ignored2, and job opportunities and wage differences are the only explanatory 
variables of workers’ locational choices.   A separate purpose of this paper, therefore, 
is to incorporate the fact that people value the place of living per se, to see whether it 
matters for the question of whether or not there is too much centralisation (which it 
turns out not to do).  
 
In the cities, there are gains from agglomeration, so income levels there will be higher 
the larger the city.  In rural areas, people work in agriculture; and their income levels 
depend on the total size of the agricultural sector (because the price of food falls with 
increased production).  In the first part of the article, this framework is used to look at 
                                                          
2 An exception is Ludema and Wooton (2000), but their reason for assuming locational preferences is 
different.  They assume locational preferences in order to ease the modeling of an upward-sloping 
labour demand curve. 
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an economy with one city in which the city government supplies tax-financed local 
services.  One might think that the gains from agglomeration would make the city 
over-provide public goods in order to attract more people and that this could offset the 
standard result that the city is too small.  That is not the case.  At the margin, it is (by 
the envelope theorem) not possible to attract more people, so the only effect of 
expanding the public sector is to crowd out employment in the private sector, which is 
more costly when there are industrial agglomerations than when there are not. The 
presence of agglomeration gains will therefore actually make local governments 
supply less public services than they would otherwise do.  The result that the city 
becomes too small and the rural sector too large is, if anything, strengthened. 
 
In the second part of the paper, the model is extended to cover many regions and 
many cities.  It is shown that the results regarding the number and size of cities are 
robust as long as people are mobile within regions only – in that case there will be at 
most one city per region; each will be too small; and some regions that ought to have 
cities will not have any.  If we allow for interregional mobility as well (with 
individual preferences over regions as well as over rural vs. urban life), however, it 
could be that both big cities and rural areas will be overpopulated (relative to the 
optimum), while smaller cities could be both too few and too small. 
 
2 An informal overview of the model 
 
We consider a closed economy consisting of rural areas and a number of cities. There 
are three sectors of production; the public, private and agricultural sectors.  The public 
and private sectors are located in cities, the agricultural in rural areas (called the 
periphery).   
 
There are a fixed number of inhabitants in the economy, each inhabitant supplying 
one unit of labour inelastically.  Total labour supply thus equals the total number of 
inhabitants.   
 
Workers are perfectly mobile within the economy, and choose location based on a 
consideration of where their total utility will be highest.  Utility derives from the 
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consumption of private goods and from factors related to the place of residence itself.  
The utility derived solely from living in a specific place differ between individuals, 
but is exogenous to the model.  We assume that people live in the same place as they 
work.  Consumption goods are freely and costlessly traded within the economy.  The 
consumption an individual enjoys therefore depends only upon the local wage rate.  
  
Goods produced in the public sector are used as intermediates in the production 
processes of private firms.  Examples of such goods might be infrastructure widely 
defined og general training experience.  We call these goods public inputs.  They are 
financed by local taxes levied on people living in the cities. Private firms produce a 
homogenous consumption good (which is used as numéraire) with labour and local 
public inputs as production factors. There are external economies of scale in the 
private sector, so productivity increases with the size of the sector (i.e. with the total 
volume of private sector production).  The individual firm, however, does not take 
account of the scale economies because they are external to the firm.  As a result 
workers will be paid the value of their average product which is lower than their 
marginal product.  Hence there is a market failure in the labour market.   
 
In the periphery agricultural production takes place with labour as the only factor of 
production.   
 
In the first part of the paper (section 3) we study a single-city economy, i.e. an 
economy in which there is only one city in addition to the periphery.  We describe the 
economy’s production structure, and from this we derive labour demand.  We 
continue by studying labour supply, which depends on relative wage rates and 
residential preferences.  Having developed labour demand and supply, we study 
labour market equilibria and compare these to the efficient outcomes to see whether 
there will be too much or too little urbanisation.  Finally, we find the optimal local 
supply of public inputs and discuss how any market bias regarding urbanisation is 
affected by local governments pursuing policies to supply the optimal amount of 
public inputs.   
 
In the second part of the paper (section 4), we expand the analysis to a multi-region 
economy with an endogenous number of cities.  The context is an economy consisting 
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of several regions, each of which is formally like the one studied in part one, and in 
which cities will be formed spontaneously so long as they are economically viable 
and stable.  The purpose is to address the question of whether a free market economy 
produces too much or too little centralisation.  In this context we also discuss possible 
effects of centrally initiated decentralisation policies.         
  
3 A single­city economy 
 
We consider an economy consisting of the periphery and one city.  The economy has 
n inhabitants, each of whom inelastically supplies one unit of labour.  The n 
inhabitants thus constitute total labour supply.  Workers are perfectly mobile between 
the periphery and the city, and make a joint decision on where to live and work based 
on where their standard of living will be highest.   
 
In this section we describe the production structure, employment and local public 
inputs supply in the single-city economy.   
 
3.1 Production and labour demand 
 
3.1.1 The private sector 
 
In the private sector a large number of identical firms produce homogenous 
consumption goods with labour and a local public input as production factors.  The 
aggregate production function is 
 
(1) ( ) xnzxx ,ϕ= , 
 
where x is total production in the private sector, xn  total private sector employment, z 
the total amount of public inputs, and ( )zx,ϕ  is a function capturing labour 
productivity.  The labour-productivity function captures the external economies and 
any interaction there might be between external scale economies and the supply of 
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local public inputs. Note that we do not model the sources of externalities explicitly; 
(1) should be interpreted as a reduced form of the market-linkage models developed 
in the “new economic geography” literature. 
 
We assume that the labour-productivity function is increasing and concave in both 
arguments: 
 
(2) ( ) 0, >∂
∂≡
x
zx
x
ϕϕ ,  0),( 2
2
<∂
∂≡
x
zx
xx
ϕϕ , 
 
(3) ( ) 0, >∂
∂≡
z
zx
z
ϕϕ , 0),( 2
2
<∂
∂≡
z
zx
zz
ϕϕ . 
 
Solving (1) for the externality to express production as a function of labour and public 
inputs only, obtains 
 
(4) ),( zngx x= . 
 
To find the derivatives of this function (the social marginal products of labour and 
public inputs), we first differentiate equation (1), 
 
(5) ( ) ( ) ( ) xxzxx dnzxdznzxdxnzxdx ,,, ϕϕϕ ++= , 
 
which can be rewritten as 
 
(6) ( ) ( ) ( ) dznzxdnzxdxnzx xzxxx ,,),1( ϕϕϕ +=− . 
 
Solving this, gives 
 
(7) ( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−=∂
∂≡ x
x
xn nzx
zx
n
xg
,1
1, ϕϕ  
 
and 
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 (8) ( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−=∂
∂≡ x
x
x
zz nzx
nzx
z
xg
,1
1, ϕϕ ,
 
 
respectively.   
 
The terms in parentheses in equations (7) and (8) represent the external scale 
economies.  With no economies of scale in the private sector, the marginal product of 
labour would have been ϕ  and the marginal product of public inputs xz nϕ .  Due to 
external economies of scale, marginal products are higher.   
 
The production function of firm i is  
 
(9) ( ) ii nzxx ,ϕ= , 
 
where ix  is firm i’s production and in  is the number of workers employed by firm i.  
Because each firm is small relative to the entire industry, the effect of ix  on x  is 
negligible, so the individual firm takes the function ( )zx,ϕ  to be constant, i.e. it 
perceives ( )zx,ϕ  as homogenous of degree zero.   
  
The private consumption good is used as numéraire and the price is set equal to one. 
The inverse labour demand function from the private sector is given by the (firm) 
perceived value of the marginal product of labour:  
 
(10) ( )zxwcD ,ϕ= . 
 
Combining equations (4) and (10), private sector labour demand can be expressed as 
an indirect function of the wage rate and local public inputs supply, 
 
(11) ( )zzngw xcD ),,(ϕ= .  
  
The private sector labour demand curve is upward-sloping due to external economies: 
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Productivity and hence the wage rate (which equals the firm perceived value of the 
marginal product of labour) increases with the number of employees in the private 
sector.  The slope of the labour demand curve is found by differentiating equation 
(11) with respect to xn , giving 
 
(12) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,1
1,,, >⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−==∂
∂
x
x
xnxx
c
D
nzx
zxzxgzx
n
w
ϕϕϕϕ . 
 
Differentiating equation (11) once more shows that the demand curve is concave3:     
 
(13) ( ) 01
1
2
2
2
<+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−=+=∂
∂
nnxx
x
xxnnxnnxxx
c
D g
n
ggg
n
w ϕϕϕϕϕϕ . 
 
 
Labour demand increases with the volume of public inputs supply.  If the provision of 
public inputs increases, private firms increase production and therefore demand more 
labour.  This is illustrated by the two demand curves in figure 1 (where z&&  denotes a 
larger amount of public inputs production than zˆ ).   
 
 
Figure 1: Private sector labour demand 
                                                          
3 Provided that 0<nng , i.e. that the production function is concave in n.   
( )( )zzng x &&&& ,,ϕ  
( )( )zzng x ˆ,ˆ,ϕ  
 
xn  
cw  
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3.1.2 The public sector 
 
Local public inputs are produced with labour as the only factor of production.  Local 
governments decide on the amount of public inputs production.  For the time being 
we do not consider how regional governments make their decisions, but simply take 
the chosen amount as given.  Optimal public inputs supply is studied in chapter 3.4.   
 
Assume constant coefficients in public inputs production.  Public sector labour 
demand is aznz = , where a is a positive constant.  For simplicity we choose units 
such that a equals one, and then public sector labour demand becomes 
 
(14) znz = .   
 
Total costs of public inputs production are  
 
(15) zcz nwTC = , 
 
where cw  is the wage rate in the city.   
 
We assume that the city is self-financed (i.e. does not receive any grants from, or pay 
taxes to a central government).  Public inputs production is financed through a 
uniform tax on the inhabitants of the city with per capita tax  
 
(16) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=== c
z
c
c
zc
c
z
c
n
nw
n
nw
n
TCt
,
 
 
where cn  is the total number of workers in the city (observe from (16) that the tax 
decreases with the number of city inhabitants).   
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3.1.3 The agricultural sector 
 
Agricultural production takes place with labour as the only factor of production 
according to the production function 
 
(17) ( )ynyy = , 
 
where y is total agricultural production and yn agricultural sector employment.  
( )yny  has constant returns to scale.  We choose units so that the agricultural sector 
production function becomes 
 
(18) yny = .   
 
Agricultural sector labour demand is implicitly given by the value of the marginal 
product of labour in agricultural production, 
 
(19) yn
yp
D pypw == , 
 
where pDw  is the wage rate agricultural “firms” are willing to pay and 
yp  is the price 
of agricultural products.   
 
We look at a closed economy and use the manufacturing output as numeraire.  We 
also assume that demand for agricultural products is completely income-inelastic 
(derived e.g. from an additively separable utility function which is concave in the 
agricultural good and linear in the private good).  The price of the agricultural good  
will then depend only (and negatively) on the quantity produced and sold, which in 
turn is determined solely by total agricultural employment.  Thus, the value of the 
marginal product of labour in the agricultural sector, i.e. the agricultural wage, 
depends only, and negatively, on agricultural employment.  
 
(20) ( ) 0; <pnpp wnw  
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 The agricultural sector labour demand curve is illustrated in figure 2.   
 
 
Figure 2: Agricultural sector labour demand 
 
 
3.2 Residential preferences and labour supply 
 
Workers are perfectly mobile between the city and the periphery, and choose to locate 
where their total utility will be highest.  Utility derives from consumption of 
differentiated and agricultural goods, and from factors related to the place of resi-
dence.  We assume that consumer goods (agricultural products and goods produced in 
the private sector in the city) are freely and costlessly traded within the economy, so 
consumers face the same prices wherever they live.  The determinants of individual 
utility will then only be disposable income and place of residence.  
 
Disposable income in the city is the wage minus the city tax 
 
(21)  ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=−= c
z
cccc
n
nwtw 1ω . 
 
 
( )pppD nww =
pn
pw  
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while disposable income in the periphery is simply the wage 
 
(22) pp w=ω ,  
 
where c denotes the city and p the periphery.  
 
We do not model why people, cet. par., prefer to live in one place rather than another, 
but simply take this as exogenously given.  Residential preferences are modelled by 
an individual-specific parameter jα  which shows the additional consumer surplus 
person j gets from living in the periphery as compared to living in the city.  The 
higher the value of jα , the higher is his preference for living in the periphery.  Note 
that jα   might be negative, in which case person j, cet.par., prefers to live in the city.   
 
The utility functions of all individuals are assumed additive in consumption and place 
of residence, and the marginal utility of consumption constant (and equal to one).  If 
person j lives in the city, his utility will therefore be  
 
(23) ( ) cccccj twuu −=== ωω . 
 
If he lives in the periphery his utility will be 
 
(24) ( ) jpjpjppj wuu ααωαω +=+== , . 
 
Any distribution of labour compatible with equilibrium must be such that the 
marginal inhabitant is indifferent between living in the city and in the periphery, 
 
(25) M
pcc
M
pc wtw ααωω +=−⇒+= , 
 
where M denotes the marginal inhabitant.   
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Let ( )MF α  be the number of people who values the sheer pleasure of rural living 
higher than the marginal inhabitant does, i.e. the number of people for whom 
Mj αα > .  ( )MF α  is thus the equilibrium number of inhabitants in the periphery, 
 
(26) ( )Mp Fn α= . 
 
Those who do not live in the periphery, live in the city.  Labour supply in the city is 
therefore 
 
(27) ( )Mpc Fnnnn α−=−= . 
 
3.3   Equilibrium and efficiency 
 
Labour market equilibrium obtains when (a) the marginal worker is indifferent 
between working in either sector and (b) the labour market clears, i.e. the sum of em-
ployment in the sectors add up to the total labour stock. 
 
We perform a four-step analysis of labour market equilibrium, with the four steps 
being analyses when there are  
1. No public inputs production and no residential preferences. 
2. No public inputs production, but workers have residential preferences. 
3. Public inputs production, but no residential preferences. 
4. Public inputs production and workers have residential preferences. 
Such step-wise analysis allows for isolation of different effects on the equilibrium 
conditions.  The first case only serves as a benchmark, showing some of the well-
known results from the new economic geography literature.  Case 2 shows how 
residential preference affects existence, uniqueness and stability of geographic 
equilibria. Case 3 enables identification of the conditions under which there will be a 
local supply of public inputs and what effects that will have on productivity and 
urbanisation (eller centralisation?).  The final case shows how public input supply and 
residential preferences can interact.  It also sets up the complete model used (in 
section 3.4) to discuss optimal local policy. 
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3.3.1 No public inputs production, no residential preferences 
 
We begin the equilibrium analysis by assuming that there is no production of public 
inputs and that workers have no residential preferences.  This is the standard case 
discussed in the literature and can therefore serve as a point of reference. 
 
No production of public inputs implies that there are two sectors of production: The 
private sector located in the city, and the agricultural sector located in the periphery.   
 
No residential preferences and perfect mobility of workers between sectors imply that 
workers will enter the sector in which they get the highest income.  In the agricultural 
sector workers are paid the value of their marginal product, as given by equation (20): 
 
(20) ( ) 0; <pnpp wnw  
 
In the private sector workers are paid the value of their average product, as given by 
equation (11), but where z=0: 
 
(11’) ( ))( xc ngw ϕ= .  
 
Workers have no residential preferences.  Implicitly, therefore, they have no a priori 
preferences for working in either of the sectors (they are located at different places).  
Workers are perfectly mobile between sectors, and this mobility ensures that any 
labour market equilibrium is such that the wage rate is the same across sectors; i.e. the 
marginal product of labour in the agricultural sector equals the average product of 
labour in the private (agglomeration) sector, 
 
(28)  ( )( ) pxpc wngww =⇒= 0,0,ϕ  . 
. 
The labour market must clear, which implies that the sum of employment in the two 
sectors must add up to the total labour stock, 
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(29) nnn pc =+  
 
The two conditions for labour market equilibrium when there is no public input 
production and workers have no residential preferences are given by equations (28) 
and (29). 
 
Labour market equilibrium is illustrated in figures 3a and 3b.   
 
In figure 3a we measure labour along the horizontal axis and wages/returns per 
worker along the vertical axis.  The length of the horizontal axis is given by the total 
labour stock.  From left we measure the number of workers in the private sector, nc ,  
from right the number of agricultural workers, n p  (which coincides with the number 
of inhabitants in the city and in the periphery, respectively).  Private sector labour 
demand is given by the curve ( )cc nw  and agricultural labour demand by the curve 
( )pp nw .  
 
As drawn, there are two equilibria satisfying equations (28) and (29), called B and D 
in figure 3a.  These are equilibria because the return per worker is the same in both 
sectors and total employment in the two sectors add up to the total labour stock.  Only 
D, however, is a stable equilibrium.  The stability condition is that the slope of the 
agricultural sector labour demand curve is steeper than the slope of the private sector 
labour demand curve,  
 
(30) ( ) ( ) ( ) pxxx wnzxzxzx <⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
− ,1
1,, ϕϕϕ . 
 
The likelihood of this happening increases with decreased agglomeration gains and 
the larger the returns to labour in agricultural production.   
 
There is also the possibility that we end up in a situation in which the entire labour 
stock is employed in the agricultural sector - the point called A in figure 3a.  In this 
situation, no worker will have any incentives to switch to the private sector because 
the wage rate in the agricultural sector is higher than what they may earn in the 
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private.  As the two sectors are located at geographically different places this implies 
that everyone lives in the periphery.   
 
D is a diversified equilibrium, whereas the situation depicted by A is an equilibrium 
in agricultural production only.  B is the critical mass of the city.  If, for some reason 
or other, the size of the city is smaller than this, we end up in A.  If the size is larger 
than this, we end up in the diversified equilibrium. 
 
Labour market equilibrium may alternatively be illustrated as in figure 3b, which is 
derived from figure 3a.  Figure 3b illustrates equilibrium by considering the wage 
differential between the private and the agricultural sectors.  The wage differential, 
( )pc ww − , is given by the vertical distance between the two curves and in figure 3a.  
A, B and D in figure 3b correspond to A, B and D in figure 3a.   
 
The stability condition, as given by equation (30), corresponds to a condition saying 
that the stable equilibrium is at the decreasing part of the wage differential curve,  
 
(31) ( ) 0<−c pcdn wwd .       
 
At the increasing part of the wage differential curve, the marginal economic gain from 
increasing the number of city dwellers is larger than the loss in residential surplus of 
the marginal inhabitant of the periphery.  Hence, a stable equilibrium cannot occur at 
the increasing part of the wage differential curve.    
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Figures 3a and 3b: Labour market equilibrium, no public inputs production, no 
residential preferences 
 
 
 
B  
D  
A  
( )pp nw  
( )cc nw  
cn  pn  
pc ww −  pc ww −  
B  D
cn  pn  
pc ww −  
w  w  
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These results, the possibility of either a diversified or a concentrated equilibrium, are 
well-known from the literature on new economic geography - see e.g. Krugman 
(1991a) and Krugman (1991b).  From this literature it is also well-known that 
equilibrium implies unexploited scale economies.  This can be seen in figure 4.  D 
corresponds to the diversified stable equilibrium D in figures 3a and 3b.  We have 
drawn private and agricultural sectors labour demands, i.e. the firm perceived value of 
the marginal product of labour in private goods production and the value of the 
marginal product of labour in agricultural production, respectively.  The true value of 
the marginal product of labour in private goods production is, however, larger than 
the individual firm perceives.  The true value is given by equation (7), 
 
(7) ( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−=∂
∂≡ x
x
xn nzx
zx
n
xg
,1
1, ϕϕ  
and illustrated by the upper concave curve in figure 4.  The efficient equilibrium is E, 
which implies higher private sector employment and lower agricultural, and hence 
that the scale economies are more fully exploited.   
 
 
 
Figure 4: Unexploited scale economies in the stable equilibrium, no public inputs 
production, no residential preferences  
 
 
B  
D
A  
( )pp nw  
 
E
pn  cn  
( )cc nw  
pc ww ,  pc ww ,  
ng  
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3.3.2 Residential preferences, no public inputs production  
 
When workers do have residential preferences, the wage rate alone no longer 
determines a worker’s location.  Residential preferences are represented by the 
individual-specific parameter jα .  Workers are perfectly mobile and choose location 
based on where their total returns, including the one derived from place of living per 
se, will be highest.  Mobility of workers ensures that the wage rate in the city equals 
the sum of the wage rate in the periphery and the marginal inhabitant’s residential 
surplus derived from living in the periphery rather than in the city,  
  
(32) M
pc ww α+=  
 
Labour market clearing says that total employment in the private and agricultural 
sectors must add to the total labour stock, 
 
(29) nnn pc =+ . 
 
The two conditions for labour market equilibrium when there is no public input 
production but workers have residential preferences are given by equations (32) and 
(29).   
 
Equilibrium is illustrated in figure 5.  The α -curve shows workers in ascending order 
with regards to preferences for living in the periphery.    
 
In figure 5 there is one unique equilibrium, E.  To ensure a unique stable equilibrium, 
residential preferences must not be too weak.  More precisely, the wage rate in the 
periphery must never be high enough compared to the wage rate in the city to induce 
the person who most highly values urban living to move to the periphery,    
 
(33) ( ) ( )nww pc −< 01α  ,  
 
where 1 denotes the person who values living in the city highest.  
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If this condition is not fulfilled, there will be three possible equilibria, one unstable 
and two stable.  The stable equilibria are the well-known ones – a concentrated 
equilibrium where everyone lives in the periphery and a diversified one with 
settlement in both the city and in the periphery.    
 
This could be illustrated in figure 5, with a less steep residential preference-curve than 
the one depicted, alternatively a wage differential curve located further down.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Labour market equilibrium with residential preferences: One unique 
diversified equilibrium 
 
We see that residential preferences affect equilibria in three different ways.   
 
First, they make it less likely that there are multiple equilibria.  As seen from figure 5, 
provided that residential preferences are not very weak, there will be one unique 
equilibrium, while there would have been three without residential preferences.   For 
the same reason, the equilibrium allocation of people between the centre and 
periphery will be less sensitive to external shocks – residential preferences reduces 
 
α
B  D
  
cn  
pn  
E
pc ww −  pc ww −  
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mobility and thus dampens the effects of shocks. 
 
Second, with residential preferences, there will generally be an equilibrium wage gap 
between the centre and the periphery.  If the marginal resident gets a higher “value 
added” from living in the periphery rather than in the city, 0>Mα  , the equilibrium 
wage rate in the periphery will be lower than in the city.  If the marginal inhabitant 
values living in the city higher than in the periphery, 0<Mα  , the opposite happens – 
but empirically this is of little, if any, relevance.  (Only if the marginal resident gets 
the same pleasure solely from living in the periphery and the city, 0=Mα , will there 
be no wage gap between the two).   
 
Third, the relative sizes of the city and the periphery differ from the sizes when 
workers have no residential preferences.  If the marginal person gets a higher 
residential surplus solely from living in the periphery rather than in the city, then the 
equilibrium size of the city will be smaller than in the no-residential preference case.  
If, forthe marginal inhabitant, residential surplus of living in the city is higher than the 
surplus of living in the periphery, then the opposite happens: The equilibrium size of 
the city will be smaller than in the no-residential preference case. 
 
3.3.3 Public inputs production, no residential preferences 
 
The third case is one with public input supply, but in which workers do not have 
residential preferences.   
 
Note first that public inputs production and supply have two opposing effects on the 
production by private firms:  First, a “productivity effect”: Public inputs are used 
directly in the production processes of firms in the private industry, and the provision 
of public inputs therefore increases private productivity and thereby private firms’ 
labour demand. Second, it has a “crowding-out effect” in the labour market: Workers 
are required for public inputs production and so part of the labour stock will be 
publicly employed.  The number of workers available to firms in the private sector 
decreases.  This we call the “employment effect”.   
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To see these effects more clearly, recall first that a condition for labour market 
equilibrium is that the marginal inhabitant is indifferent as to where he lives and 
works, 
 
(28)  ( )( ) pcxpcc wtngwtw =−⇒=− 0,0,ϕ . 
 
The wage rates must be equal in the two sectors.  This is ensured by the mobility of 
workers.   
 
Secondly, the clearing condition, that the whole labour stock is employed, must be 
ensured 
 
(35) nnnn pxz =++ . 
 
I.e. every person in the labour stock must be employed either in the public, the private 
or in the agricultural sector.   
 
Labour market equilibrium for a given volume of public input production is illustrated 
in figure 6.  With no public input production the diversified equilibrium is 0D .  The 
employment effect of public inputs production is seen by a reduction in the size of the 
“bathtub diagram”.  The length of the horizontal axis measured from the far right 
corner to the second right corner equals the number of public employees.  From the 
left hand corner we measure the number of private sector workers, from the second 
right hand corner the number of agricultural sector workers.  The isolated 
employment effect is seen by the horizontal shift, of length zn , in the agricultural 
sector labour demand curve – the movement from equilibrium 0D to d.       
 
The productivity effect of public inputs supply is seen by an upwards shift in the 
private sector labour demand curve, which changes the equilibrium from d to 1D .     
 
The total effect of public inputs production and supply is the sum of the crowding-out   
and productivity effects.   Without external scale economies, the two would pull in the 
same direction in terms of wages and employment – both would contribute to higher 
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wages in the city; and as a result, more people would move there. With external scale 
economies, however, the two pull in opposite directions.  The direct productivity 
effect contributes to higher wages in the city.  Increased public employment, however, 
does the opposite:  By bidding people away from the private sector, it contributes to 
lower private sector productivity.  This could completely offset the direct productivity 
effect, in which case the urban wage would fall and people would move out of the 
city. 
 
To see the exact condition, suppose one person, initially employed in the private 
sector, is hired by the local government to increase production of public inputs.  
Losing one person reduces private sector productivity by ϕxgn .  In the public sector, 
the person produces an extra unit of z , which will raise private sector productivity by 
ϕz +ϕxgz.  For the city wage rate to rise, therefore, we must have ϕz >ϕx gn − gz( ).  
 
It will, of course, never be a rational policy for the city government to produce public 
inputs (which would also require higher taxes) if the net effect is to lower the wage.  
If local public goods are supplied, therefore, we can be certain that the direct 
productivity effect dominates the crowding-out effect at the margin.  We can go even 
further:  The city will not increase the supply of public inputs unless the resulting 
increase in the wage level is at least as high as the necessary increase in the local tax.  
It follows that local public inputs, if provided, will have a positive effect on the size of 
the city, and a negative effect on the population in rural areas. 
 
We shall discuss the optimal supply of local public inputs – including the question of 
whether local policy contributes to excess urbanisation – in greater detail in section 
3.4  
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Figure 6: Labour market equilibrium, public inputs production, no residential 
preferences  
 
 
3.3.4 Public inputs production and residential preferences 
 
Let us finally, before we turn to the normative questions, set up the complete model 
with both public inputs production and workers with residential preferences.   
 
Generally, labour market equilibrium obtains when the marginal worker is indifferent 
between working in either sector and the labour market clears. 
 
The “indifference”-condition means that the marginal worker is indifferent between 
working in the public, private or agricultural sectors.  The public and private sectors 
are located in the city whereas the agricultural sector is located in the periphery, and 
so the “indifference”-condition implies that the marginal worker is indifferent 
between living in the city or in the periphery.  If he lives in the city his utility equals 
the private goods consumption he enjoys there (which, due to the assumptions that 
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everyone supplies one unit of labour inelastically and that the price of private goods 
are normalised to one, equals the net wage rate in the city), 
 
(36)  crcM twu −=
  
 If he lives in the periphery his utility is the sum of private goods consumption there 
(which equals the wage rate in the periphery) and the residential surplus derived from 
living in the periphery per se 
 
(37) M
pp
M wu α+= . 
 
The “indifference”-condition becomes, 
 
(38) ccM
pc
M
p
M twwuu −=+⇒= α  
 
From (38) we find Mα , 
 
(39) pccM wtw −−=α  
 
The second equilibrium condition is that the labour market clears, i.e. the sum of 
employment in the three sectors equals the total labour stock, 
 
(35) nnnn pxz =++ . 
 
When equations (39) and (35) hold; labour market equilibrium obtains.  This is 
illustrated in figures 7a and 7b.   
 
Figure 7a is a reproduction of figure 6.  Figure 7b shows the wage difference between 
the city and the periphery, and is derived from figure 6.  Without further assumptions, 
however, we cannot conclude as to whether the wage differential curve will shift 
downwards or upwards, i.e. whether the wage gap between the centre and the 
periphery will grow or decline.  We know that employment in the agricultural sector 
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declines, causing a wage increase in the periphery.  If the private sector employment 
also declines, then the wage rate in the city will fall and the wage difference clearly 
declines causing a downward movement of the curve. If, on the other hand, private 
sector employment increases then the wage gap may either increase or decrease.  
Labour market equilibrium is at the point where the residential preference curve 
crosses the wage differential curve – point E.  Provided that residential preferences 
are not too weak, we get one unique stable equilibrium.   
 
We see that there is one point in the figure that fulfils the two requirements for labour 
market equilibrium, point E, i.e. there is one unique equilibrium.  Provided that the 
residential preferences are not too weak there will always be one unique equilibrium 
(see section 3.3.2).     
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Figures 7a and 7b: Labour market, public inputs production and residential 
preferences 
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3.4 Optimal public inputs supply 
 
So far, we have taken the amount of public inputs supply as given, i.e. we have treated 
z as if it were exogenously given.  The amount of local public inputs provision is, 
however, clearly a political issue.  An important question in relation to the overall 
issue of centralisation is whether local governments will want to use public inputs 
supply in a way which attracts an excessive number of people to the city. 
 
Local governments choose the amount of public inputs supply so as to maximise the 
welfare of their citizens. The utility of a representative resident in the city is given by 
his disposable income, as shown by equation (23),    
 
(23) ccc twu −= . 
 
Inserting for per capita tax, ct , from equation (16) and bearing in mind our choice of 
units such that public sector labour demand equals the amount of public inputs 
production, zn z = , gives us the utility of a city dweller as 
 
(40) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= ccc n
zwu 1 . 
 
We assume welfare is the sum of individual utilities.  City welfare is thus 
 
(41) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= cccc n
zwnW 1 . 
 
Local governments choose the amount of public inputs production so as to maximise 
the welfare of its current inhabitants.  As long as the number of inhabitants is given, 
this gives the same result as maximising the utility of a representative inhabitant, and 
so we may write the maximisation problem of local governments as  
 
(42) ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= cz
c
z n
zwu 1maxmax . 
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The optimal amount of public inputs supply is such that there is no welfare gain from 
a marginal increase of public inputs supply: 
 
(43) 0=
dz
du c  
 
which gives 4 
 
(44) 01 =∂
∂+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+∂
∂⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−=
dz
dn
n
u
dz
dn
n
w
z
w
n
z
n
w
dz
du c
c
cx
x
cc
cc
cc
 
 
Any optimum is such that the last term of equation (44) equals zero; i.e. there is no 
utility gain from a marginal increase in public inputs supply.  No utility gain implies 
that there will be no migration either – no one gains from moving to or from the city.  
So, the optimal amount of public inputs supply is such that  
 
(45) 0=
dz
dnc . 
 
                                                          
4 
Inserting for  from equation (40) gives 
 
0
1
=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −
=
dz
n
zwd
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c
c
 
 
Carrying out this differentiation gives 
 
01 =∂
∂+⎟⎟⎠
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⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+∂
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By setting the last term of equation (44) equal to zero, the condition for optimal public 
inputs supply becomes 
 
(46) 01 =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+∂
∂⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−=
dz
dn
n
w
z
w
n
z
n
w
dz
du x
x
cc
cc
cc
 
 
which gives the optimum condition5 
 
(47) cxx
cc
wn
n
w
z
w =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−∂
∂
,
 
 
i.e. optimal public inputs supply is such that the private sector marginal gain equals 
the direct costs of public inputs production.  The left hand side of equation (47) is the 
private sector marginal gain from increased public inputs supply.  Increased public 
inputs supply leads to increased private sector production.  The value of this is xz nw .  
In order to produce the public inputs, however, some workers will have to be 
transferred from the private to the public sector.  This reduces private production.  
The value of this is xn nw .  Thus, 
x
n
x
z nwnw −  is the net value of a marginal increase 
in public inputs production.  The right hand side is the direct cost of a marginal 
increase in public inputs production, namely the wage rate. 
 
 
                                                          
5  
( ) 011 =⎟⎟⎠
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Rewriting equation (47) gives  
 
(48) xn
x
z nwwnw += . 
 
Equation (47) is a modified version of the Samuelson rule (Samuelson (1954)) where 
the left hand side is the sum of marginal values of public input and the right hand side 
is the social marginal costs of public inputs.  The social marginal costs of public 
inputs equal the sum of the direct and indirect costs.  The direct costs are the wage 
payments, the indirect costs are the private sector productivity costs (caused by 
reduced labour supply for private firms).   
 
In the earlier discussion of the effects of local public inputs production, it was found 
that public inputs will not be produced unless they contribute to higher disposable 
income in the city, and that such production therefore will contribute to a larger city 
population, and a smaller rural population, than otherwise (see section 3.3.3).  In that 
sense, local production of public inputs contributes to greater urbanisation. 
 
That does not mean that local public inputs production (or, more generally, local 
public policy) contributes to excessive urbanisation, however.  The potential for 
raising productivity through provision of local public inputs gives rise to a real 
economic gain which is in the interest of the economy as a whole to realise.  To reap 
the benefits, more people must live in the city.  Thus, the urbanisation effect of local 
public inputs provision does not reflect a market failure. 
 
In fact, from equation (48) it follows that optimal local policies will not contribute to 
excessive centralisation.  If policies are pursued to maximize per capita real income, 
they cannot, at the margin, have any effect on the size of the local population.  The 
only way in which agglomeration affects optimum policies, therefore, is by raising the 
opportunity cost of resources used for public production (the second term on the right-
hand side of (48)).  It follows that the supply of public inputs, ceteris paribus, will be 
smaller, not larger, in the presence of private agglomeration effects. 
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4 A multi­region economy  
 
 
We now extend the model to a multi-region economy, and assume there are R regions.  
Within each region there is a periphery.  K regions also has a city, where RK ≤ .  The 
periphery and the cities are all formally like those studied in the previous sections.  
Specifically, there are external returns in private sector production.  The number of 
cities is determined endogenously through a free-entry condition.  The idea is that 
new cities will emerge if they are economically viable, so the equilibrium number of 
cities will be given by the equilibrium number compatible with a stable labour market 
equilibrium.  
 
In the single-city economy labour market equilibrium was characterised by two 
conditions:  Labour market clearing and the condition that the marginal inhabitant 
was indifferent as to where he lived and worked.   
 
In a model with several cities, the same two conditions apply for any labour market 
equilibrium.  In addition, there is the free-entry condition: The number of cities must 
be the maximum number consistent with equilibrium.  Thus, labour market 
equilibrium in a multi-region economy is characterised by 
 
i. The labour market clears, i.e. the sum of employment in all cities and in the 
periphery (which equals the sum of private and agricultural sector employment, 
respectively) add up to the total stock 
ii. The marginal worker is indifferent between working in either sector, which is the 
same as being indifferent between living in either location 
iii. The number of cities is the maximum number consistent with the two preceding 
conditions 
 
We begin by looking at these three conditions in some greater detail. 
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i. Labour market clearing 
The first condition for labour market equilibrium is that the labour market clears in 
each region i.e. the sum of employment in the city (if any) and the periphery adds up 
to the total labour supply, 
 
(49) ci
p
i nnn += ,  i=1,...,R 
 
where R is the number of regions, n the number of workers in each region, pn  the 
number of agricultural workers and cn  the number of city workers.   
 
If there is a city in the region, labour supply in the periphery is given by the number 
of people who gets a higher residential surplus solely from living in the periphery than 
the marginal inhabitant does, 
 
(50) ( )Mipi Fn α= .   i=1,...,R  
 
Inverting equation (50) gives the residential surplus of the marginal inhabitant as a 
function of the number of residents in the periphery, 
 
(51)  ( )piMi nG=α ,  i=1,...,R. 
 
Inserting for pn  from equation (49) gives the residential surplus of the marginal 
inhabitant as a function of the number of city dwellers, 
 
(52) ( ) ( )ciciM nnGn −=α .  i=1,...,R. 
 
If there is no city in a region, all the inhabitants of the region work in the agricultural 
sector, so the number of agricultural workers equals the number of residents 
 
(53) nn pi =  i=K+1,...,R. 
 
The total number of agricultural workers in the economy is the sum of agricultural 
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workers in the regions with and without a city, i.e.  
 
(54) ∑
=
+−=
K
i
p
i
p nnKRn
1
)(  
 
where pn  is the total number of agricultural workers in the economy. 
 
 
ii. “Indifference” condition 
The second condition for labour market equilibrium is that the marginal inhabitant is 
indifferent between living in a city and in the periphery.  This condition applies, 
naturally, only for those regions in which there is a city.  The “indifference” condition 
is fulfilled when the utility of the marginal inhabitant is equal in the city and in the 
periphery i.e. when the wage rate in the city equals the sum of the wage rate and the 
residential surplus of the marginal inhabitant in the periphery,  
 
(55) Mi
p
i
c
i ww α+=   i=1,...,K 
 
When this indifference condition is fulfilled, the residential surplus of the marginal 
inhabitant equals the wage gap between the city and the periphery, 
 
(56) pi
c
i
M
i ww −=α  
 
The city wage rate equals the value of the average product of labour in private 
production, as given by equation (11’), p.16  
 
(11’’) ( ) ( )( )cicic ngnw ϕ= . 
 
Equation (11’’) is a modified version of (11’) where we have specified that we look at 
a single region i.  The wage rate in the periphery is given by the value of the marginal 
product of labour in agricultural production, 
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(57)   ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
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=
R
i
p
i
yp
i npw
1
. 
 
Inserting for the number of inhabitants in the periphery, pn , from equation (54), gives 
the wage rate in the periphery as a function of the number of city dwellers,  
 
(58) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−= ∑∑
==
K
i
c
i
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i nRnpnnnKRpw
11
)()( . 
 
Labour market clearing and “indifference” conditions 
Labour market equilibrium may now be summarised by 
 
(59) ( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −−= ∑=
K
i
c
i
yc
i
cM
i nRnpnw
1
α . 
 
Equation (59) incorporates both the “clearing” and “indifference” conditions.  The 
market clearing condition is fulfilled by saying that the number of residents in the 
periphery is given by the number of workers not employed in the cities (we have set 
cp Knnn −=  ) and the indifference condition is fulfilled by saying that the residential 
surplus of the marginal inhabitant is given by the wage gap between any city and the 
periphery. 
Note from (59) that the city population (and thus also the agricultural population) 
must be the same in all regions with cities.  In the following, therefore, let cn and Mα  
denote the common values for all regions with cities.   
 
iii. Free-entry condition 
The third condition for equilibrium is the free-entry condition.  Before considering it 
formally, consider first a different, but related question: How many cities are viable 
within any one region?  As the inhabitants of a particular region would be indifferent 
between cities within the region (they have preferences for urban vs. rural life; they 
also have preferences for living in their particular region; but they have no 
preferences over different cities within the region), the answer is straightforward: Any 
equilibrium with more than one city would be unstable, in the sense that any 
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difference in size between the cities – however small – would make everyone move to 
the largest city.  It is clear, therefore, that there can be at most one city in each 
region.6  
 
The free-entry question, therefore, is the maximum number of cities – in different 
regions – which is consistent with equilibrium.  Since the urban population must be 
the same in all regions with cities, the question is the maximum K consistent with 
equation (59), i.e. the maximum consistent with  
 
(59’) ( ) ( )cyccM KnRnpnw −−=α  
 
which says that the number of cities will be the maximum number consistent with 
equilibrium i.e. K is the maximum number such that (58’) is fulfilled.  This maximum 
number is the K for which  
 
(60) ( ) ( ){ }[ ]c cycccM dn KnRnpnwddnd −−=α  
 
i.e. the equilibrium must be such that a marginal increase in the number of city 
dwellers (an external person) does not change the wage gap between any city and the 
periphery.   Solving equation (60) we find 
 
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−=
pp
y
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dn
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dw
K   
 
 
Labour market equilibrium in a region in which there is a city is illustrated in figures 
8a and 8b.     
 
 
                                                          
6 I want to thank Kjetil Bjorvatn for pointing at this. 
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Figures 8a and 8b: Labour market equilibrium in a representative region with a city 
in a multi-city economy 
( )cc nw  
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F  
α
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In figure 8a we measure the number of city dwellers along the horizontal axis, and the 
wage rate along the vertical axis.  Labour demand in the city is shown by ( )cc nw , and 
labour demand in the periphery by ( )cp KnRnw − .  Labour demand in the periphery is 
decreasing in the number of workers in the periphery, and hence increasing in the 
number of city workers (the more people live in the city, the fewer live in the 
periphery).   
 
Increasing the number of cities causes an upward shift in the labour demand curve in 
the periphery, as illustrated by the movement of ( )cp KnRnw −  from the solid to the 
dotted curve.  In order to understand the mechanism behind this shift, the following 
thought experiment might be useful: Imagine that a new city is established in a region 
in which there is no city in the first place.  Some inhabitants (of this region) will move 
to the new city.  Holding the number of city dwellers in all other regions constant, the 
total number of agricultural workers decreases as a result of the new city 
establishment.  As a result, total agricultural production declines causing an increase 
in the price of agricultural products.  This price increase induces an increase in the 
value of the marginal product of labour in agricultural production, as reflected in an 
upward shift of the agricultural labour demand curve in any region.   
 
Figure 8b is derived from figure 8a, and hence also applies to a representative region 
in which there is a city.  We measure the number of workers in the city along the 
horizontal axis and the wage differential between the city and the periphery along the 
vertical axis.  Labour market equilibrium is a.o. characterised by the “indifference 
condition”; i.e. the marginal inhabitant is indifferent between living in the periphery 
or in the city.  The “indifference condition” is fulfilled when the residential surplus of 
the marginal inhabitant equals the wage differential between the city and the 
periphery.  In figure 8b, at a point in which the two curves cross.  An increase in the 
number of cities leads to higher prices of agricultural products, inducing a wage 
increase in the agricultural sector.  The wage differential between the city and the 
periphery thus decreases with the number of cities, causing a downward movement of 
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the wage differential curve – as illustrated by the movement of the wage differential 
curve from the solid to the dotted curve in figure 8b.  New cities will emerge until the 
point in which the wage differential and the residential preference curves are tangent.  
The maximum number of cities compatible with equilibrium is thus the one in which 
the wage differential curve and the residential preference curve are tangent – point F 
in figure 8b. 
 
Several features of equilibrium are worth noting: 
 
First, there will typically be cities (all of equal size) in some, but not all, regions.  
There will also be wage (and income) difference between regions in which there is a 
city and regions in which there is no city.  This can be seen most clearly from figure 
8a.  The wage rates in regions in which there is a city will be cw  and pw  in the city 
and in the periphery, respectively.  In regions where there is no city the wage rate will 
be citynow . 
 
Second, there is very little a central government can do to eliminate these income 
differences.  Since the number of cities is the maximum number compatible with 
equilibrium, attempts at establishing urban agglomerations in more regions will at 
best mean that an existing city in another region is no longer viable.  Similarly, if a 
central government attempts to eliminate the income differences through subsidies to 
agriculture, the only effect will be to reduce the equilibrium number of cities – but the 
income differences between regions with and without cities will remain. 
 
Third, the equilibrium implies that the scale economies are not fully utilised.  
Equilibrium is at a point in which the wage differential curve is rising.  This means 
that if the volume of private sector production were to increase ( cn  increases) then 
the wage rate in the cities would increase due to higher productivity.  In other words, 
the equilibrium implies that the cities are too small, and thus confirms the new-
economic-geography presumption that there is too little, not too much, urbanisation. 
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5 Extension: Interregional mobility 
 
The multi-region model in the previous section has a very rigid structure in that 
people are assumed to be perfectly mobile within regions, but not between them.  As 
an extension, we shall in this section consider a model with both interregional and 
intraregional mobility. We assume that people have residential preferences along two 
dimensions.  First, they have regional preferences, which we model as a preference 
for living in a particular region (but indifference between all the others). Second, 
people have preferences about rural vs. urban living.  These rural vs. urban 
preferences are modelled in exactly the same way as residential preferences were 
modelled in the previous sections.   We do not develop the model fully, but sketch it 
in sufficient detail to see possible outcomes and discuss economic policy.   
 
Let β  denote a person’s preference (i.e. willingness to pay) for living in the region 
they come from.  We assume that everyone is indifferent about all other regions than 
the one they come from.  So, each person has a preference β  for living in the region 
they come from in addition to the preference α  for urban vs. rural living.  The utility 
functions are 
 
(61) ( ) βα +++= xyuU . 
 
Let ( )βα ,H  be the cumulative density function over rural and regional preferences.  
I.e. ( )βα ,H  is the number of persons in a region with a rural preference parameter 
equal to or larger than α  and a regional preference parameter equal to or larger than 
β .   
 
Workers are perfectly mobile both within and between regions.  There will be a 
number of conceivable equilibria: A perfectly symmetric equilibrium with cities in all 
regions and no inter-regional movements, equilibria where some regions do not exist 
at all, equilibria with complete specialisation (complete urbanisation in some regions 
and agricultural production only in others), etc. 
 
Our focus is on policy rather than on the pure theory of spatial equilibrium.  
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Therefore, we do not make an attempt to trace all of these equilibria, but instead focus 
on the ones we think are empirically most likely: An equilibrium with cities in some 
(but not all) regions, with workers moving from purely rural regions and with an 
asymmetry between the urban regions which results in one large and a number of 
smaller cities.  
 
Why is this equilibrium possible and likely?  An equilibrium with no inter-regional 
mobility implies that there are cities in some, but not in all, regions.  People living in 
the periphery in a region and who have a low regional preference (lowβ ) and a low 
preference for living in the periphery (low α ) will have a lower utility than they 
would get if they could move to a city in another region.  If mobility is possible, 
therefore, they will move. 
 
Where will they move?  They are indifferent to other regions, so they will move to the 
city which offers the highest wage.  Initially, i.e. with no mobility, all cities offer the 
same wage rate and we may therefore expect the migrants to be evenly distributed 
between cities.  An even distribution is, however, not stable.  If, for some reason, one 
city gets one more immigrant than the others, the wage rate would become slightly 
higher there than elsewhere.  This would make all the migrants leave the other cities 
in favour of the higher-wage city.   
 
Migrants from purely rural regions (regions with no city) will therefore move to one 
city only.  Other cities will, however, continue to exist (inhabited by people with 
preferences for city-life and strong regional preferences), but they will have no 
inhabitants from other regions.  Compared to the situation when people do not move 
between regions, the other cities will be smaller because some people (those with low 
regional preferences) will move from the smaller to the large city. 
 
A likely outcome, therefore, is a rural-urban hierarchy where some regions are purely 
rural, some have small cities and one region has a large city.  This is the outcome that 
will be our focus and the one we use as the basis for policy analysis.  In order to 
analyse policy we need to formalise this equilibrium in more detail.  Let subscript A 
denote the purely rural/agricultural regions, S the regions with small cities and L the 
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region with a large city. 
 
Consider first the purely agricultural regions.  A person from such a region will, if he 
stays in the region, get utility 
 
(62) βα ++= yA pU .   
 
If this person moves to the large city, his utility will be Lw .  The marginal resident of 
a purely agricultural region will be given by 
 
(63) ( ) yLMA pw −=+ βα . 
 
The number of inhabitants in each of the purely rural regions will be the number of 
people for which ( ) ( )MAβαβα +>+  . 
 
Next, let us consider the regions with small cities.  Some people in these regions will 
choose to live in rural areas and work in the agricultural sector.  They get utility 
 
(64) βα ++= yyS pU . 
 
Some will choose to live in the small city.  Their utility will be 
 
(65) β+= SxS wU . 
 
The last group are those who prefer to move to the large city, which gives them utility 
Lw .   
 
Thus, there are two marginal person(s) in the regions with a small city: Those who are 
indifferent between living in the periphery or the city within the region, and those 
who are indifferent between staying in the region or moving to the large city.  We 
assume that the preferences are such that only the “city-lovers” are potential migrants 
to the large city i.e. we assume that there is a sufficiently strong correlation between 
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rural and regional preferences to prevent migration from the agricultural sector in 
small-city regions to the large city. 
 
With this assumption, the marginal agricultural worker is the one with rural 
preferences, MSα , equal to 
 
(66) yS
M
S pw −=α   
 
and the marginal migrant from the small-city regions is the one with regional 
preferences, MSβ , given by  
 
(67) SL
M
S ww −=β . 
 
The number of agricultural workers in each of these regions is the number of people 
for whom MSαα > .  The number of emigrants is the number of people for whom 
M
Sββ < .  The rest will be city residents. 
 
Finally, let us consider the region with a large city.  The population in this region 
consists of three groups: First, local people with a low rural preference; second, 
immigrants from small-city regions with a low rural preference.  And third, 
immigrants from purely rural regions with weak regional or rural preferences.   
 
The rural population are those people for whom MLαα > , where 
 
(68) yL
M
L pw −=α . 
 
The city population is the rest of the local population plus those from purely rural 
regions with ( ) ( )MAβαβα +<+  plus those from small-city regions with MSββ < . 
 
The exact expressions for the number of people are not possible to asses without 
further assumptions regarding ( )βα ,H .  For our analysis, however, we do not need to 
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know the exact number.   
 
Consider in this setting the effects of regional policy. Suppose that central 
governments want to promote decentralisation i.e. they want to encourage rural 
preference-people to move to rural areas, and do so by subsidising agriculture.  The 
purpose of this chapter is to briefly describe how such a policy may be analysed 
within the theoretical framework developed in this paper. 
 
Subsidising agricultural production leads to higher profitability in the agricultural 
sector, and an upwards shift in the inverse demand function for labour in the 
agricultural sector.  Migration from purely rural regions to the large city will 
definitely be reduced.  As a result of the reduced immigration from rural regions, the 
large-city wage rate declines. 
 
The agricultural subsidy also leads to higher agricultural employment in the regions 
with a small city, which might lead to a reduction in the number of viable small cities.  
If this happens, migration to the large city from small-city regions could increase. 
(Some of those originally living in small cities no longer have any city in their 
preferred region.  If they love living in cities they probably choose to move to the 
large city instead of into the periphery in their “home-region”.)   
 
This last effect, increased immigration to the large city from previously small-city 
regions, might be so large that the net outcome is both increased agricultural 
employment and a bigger large city.  The losers would be the small-city regions. 
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6 Conclusions  
 
In this paper we have developed a model for analysing centralisation and decentralisa-
tion policies.  The model is of the new economic geography type, in which there are 
gains from agglomeration in cities - acting as a centrifugal force.  These agglomera-
tion gains are counteracted by residential preferences – acting as a centripetal force.  
In the basic model, we establish the equilibrium conditions. We find that – in contrast 
to the well-established new economic geography models – there will be one unique 
stable equilibrium provided that residential preferences are not too weak.  Generally, 
there will also be a wage gap between the city and the periphery. 
 
Having developed the formal model, we first use this framework for studying the 
policies of a city government providing a locally tax-financed public input.  The aim 
of the policy is to attract economic activity to the city.  We find that the presence of 
agglomeration gains makes the government undersupply local public inputs.  The 
reason is that public inputs production – due to the agglomeration effects - raises the 
opportunity costs of resources used for public production.  This contrasts with 
previous results from new economic geography models studying public policies.  In 
this literature findings show that there are reasons to believe in a “race to the top” 
regarding local taxes (and hence the supply of publicly provided goods and services) 
because agglomeration industries create pure rents which might be taxed (see e.g. 
Andersson and Forslid (2003), Baldwin and Krugman (2004)).   
 
In the second part of the paper we extend the model to a multi-region economy, i.e. 
allowing for several regions, of which some have a city whereas others do not.  The 
number of cities is determined endogenously.  We find that there will be too few and 
too small cities as long as there is no interregional mobility.  If people are 
interregionally mobile, the result might be that there will be too many large cities and 
too many people living in rural regions, whereas the number and size of smaller cities 
will be too low. 
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